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Constraints on the
President’s Power to Interpret
Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions
By Heather Sensibaugh*

Abstract: This paper will explore whether the President has authority to violate customary
international law norms prohibiting outrages upon personal dignity. Particularly, this paper will
discuss whether the President can use his own interpretation, in the form of an executive order
pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2006, in interpreting humiliating and degrading
treatment.1 This article argues that, in interpreting the MCA, the President is bound to comply
with definitions provided by Congress. Thus, the President’s interpretive authority is constrained
by the customary meanings of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.2
Introduction
The purpose of the Military Commissions Act (MCA)3 was to give the federal
government flexibility to deal with what many Americans consider new threats and to strengthen
existing administrative mechanisms for dealing with these threats.4 Despite the gap-filling intent,
certain holes still exist in the MCA. These gaps beg the question of how and whether the
President may act in these areas. For instance, what can the President do alone and what must he
have Congressional approval to do? While the MCA clearly delegates interpretive authority to
the President,5 there are additional constraints on the President’s ability to interpret the meaning
and application of the Geneva conventions, which Congress did not alter in the MCA.

*

Heather Sensibaugh is the Special Assistant to the United States Institute of Peace. She received her BA in
international relations from Clark University and a Masters in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts
University in 2007. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.
1
Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) [hereinafter MCA].
2
“Geneva Conventions” is used here in the way it is used and defined in the MCA, supra note 1, §§ 5(b),
6(a)(4)(A). The term refers to four treaties to which the United States is a party: Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
3
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
4
152 CONG. REC. S10354, S10399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (Sen. Warner).
5
MCA, supra note 1, § 6 (a)(3).
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Some of the constraints on the President come from provisions of the MCA itself.6
Arguing during the debate of the MCA legislation in 2006, Ike Skelton contended that the MCA
should be designed to withstand legal scrutiny of its constitutionality.7 Skelton identified seven
possible defects in the MCA, one of which stated, “[I]t is questionable whether the Supreme
Court would uphold a system that purports to make the President the final arbiter of the Geneva
Convention.”8 Mark Drumbl agrees that the 2006 Military Commissions Act, although better
able to facilitate expressive goals than the commissions struck down in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,9
remains deficient in important regards.10 The first prosecution pursuant to the MCA has made
certain gaps in the legislation more apparent.11 Despite Congressional efforts, gaps in the MCA
will need to be clarified over time by the President, the Judiciary, or Congress itself.
One of the remaining gaps arises as to whether or not the President, acting alone, may
freely interpret the definition for “outrages upon personal dignity” outside the scope of the
understanding intended in the Geneva Conventions. A definition of “inhumane treatment”
outside the scope of what is permissible under the Geneva Conventions would constitute a
violation of customary international law.12 The President may violate international law when
Congress permits.13 However, Congress did not permit a violation of international law in the

6

See, e.g., MCA, supra note 1, § 3(a)(1)(a) (“Definitions”).
Mark Drumbl, Hicks in a Broader Perspective, AIDP Blog (March 28, 2007) (on file with the author).
8
House Armed Services Committee Hearing, March 29, 2007.
9
548 U.S. 557, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006). (548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
10
Mark Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, The Geneva
Conventions, and International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2007).
11
Drumbl, supra note 7.
12
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 245 (Princeton University Press 1990).
13
The President does not have plenary power to violate international law. Glennon, supra note 12, at 239.
Congress may violate international law pursuant to art. 1 § 8 (U.S. CONST.). Id. Any authority the President has to
violate international law must, by necessity, originate with a legislated grant of authority. See Diggs v. Shultz, 152
U.S. App. D.C. 313, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (1972); Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that “no enactment of Congress can be challenged on the ground that it
violates customary international law”).
7
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Geneva Conventions. Moreover, Congress did not define “outrages upon personal dignity” in
the MCA,14 thereby leaving the matter a question of interpretation delegated to the President.
This paper begins by exploring the posture of Congress with respect to the violation of
customary international law in the MCA. Specifically, this paper establishes that Congress
authorized the President to alter the content of the meaning of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners in a Time of War15 (Third Geneva Convention) Art. 3. Such action
constitutes a unilateral interpretation of an international agreement without an international
effect.16 If the President proceeded under the authority granted by Congress to interpret the
Geneva Conventions Common Art. 3 in a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
treaty, the President could abrogate the treaty on the basis of delegated authority to interpret a
treaty provision.17 Congress did not authorize the abrogation of the Geneva Conventions in the
MCA. Accordingly, in the absence of Congressional authorization, the President does not
possess sufficient independent authority to violate the Geneva Conventions through his personal
interpretation. The only interpretation by the President that would be lawful would need to be
consistent with the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and “higher standards”18
promulgated by Congress in the MCA. Thus, any Presidential executive order inconsistent with
the Geneva Convention would be unlawful as a matter of U.S. law.
This paper will analyze the Constitution, case law, and practice related to executive
interpretation of treaties to discern the President’s power to interpret the Geneva Conventions
after the passage of the MCA. This paper will also consider what the Framers intended when
14

MCA, supra note 1.
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
16
ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 345-50 (Clarendon Press 1961); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 209-210 (Oxford University Press 2d Ed. 1996) (1972).
17
I will later explain that our obligation to stop humiliating and degrading treatment does not arise from our
obligations in the Third Geneva Convention, art. 3, but rather arises from a customary international law norm based
upon the U.S. Declaration to the Convention Against Torture (see section 4 infra).
18
MCA, supra note 1, § 6 (a)(3)(A).
15
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drafting the Constitution as well as functional considerations.19 The conclusion allays fears that
the President would be able to issue an executive order permitting humiliating and degrading
treatment. Hopefully, the time will not arrive for judicial review of a questionable presidential
interpretation, but in the event it does, the courts will undoubtedly apply at least as careful an
analysis as attempted here.
1. Congress Authorized a Unilateral Interpretation Without Effect in International
Law
Determining the posture of Congress facilitates an understanding of the constraints on the
President’s ability to act in violation of international law.20 Congress may authorize a violation
of international law,21 but the MCA does not go that far. Instead, the MCA authorizes the
President to “to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions,” which
contravenes the international rules of interpretation for international treaties.22
A general rule of treaty interpretation is provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT).23 In particular, Art. 31(1) of the VCLT directs the parties to a treaty to give
effect to the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision in light of the treaty’s object and purpose.24
Although the VCLT is not a treaty in force in the U.S., because it is not a party to the treaty,25 the

19

This framework of analysis is borrowed from Glennon, supra note 12, at 52-70.
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (suggesting Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework in
Steel Seizure is more like a spectrum). Accord, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, R., concurring).
21
La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899). Compare, Edye v. Robertson (Head Money
Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); Pigeon River Improvement,
Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (noting that the act of Congress would control
in our courts as an expression of municipal law, even though it conflicted with the provision of the treaty and the
international obligation remained unaffected). See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(1987) § 115 (1-3) and reporters n.2 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Section 1 (a) states, “An act of Congress
supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United
States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or
provision cannot be fairly reconciled.” See also HENKIN, supra note 16, at 209, 485.
22
MCA, supra note 1, § 6(a)(3)(A).
23
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
24
Id.
25
There are 105 parties to the VCLT. LORI DAMROSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW ( West Group 2001).
20
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U.S. has accepted certain provisions as customary international law, including Art. 31(1).26 As a
result, U.S. courts generally apply the plain text meanings of treaties.27
In the case of the Geneva Convention, Common Article 3, subsection (1)(c), the plain
text meaning of “[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment” is unclear. The ordinary meaning of this phrase would indicate that the Geneva
Convention prohibits techniques or actions designed to punish or persuade that are customarily
applied in a specific situation28 and have the effect of lowering one’s position or dignity29 or that
cause the human character to become degraded or debased.30

At least some part of this

definition is subjective.
When the plain text meaning of a treaty is unclear, the VCLT rule of interpretation calls
for applying context31 and subsequent agreement of the parties,32 or applying a definition
intended by the parties.33 Both the VCLT and the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the U.S. suggest that interpreting the meaning of treaty terms beyond their ordinary meaning is
determined by the understanding and intent of the parties.34 Because the ordinary meaning of the
Geneva Convention is unclear, further investigation into the meaning of the phrase intended at
the time of signature of the Third Geneva Convention and subsequent agreements is necessary.
26

Id. Specifically, the United States accepts VCLT art. 31 (1) as a statement of customary international law. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 325 (1).
27
See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368, 374 (1989).
28
See definition 6(a) of “treatment” in WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 2435
(G. & C. Merriam Company 1961) [hereinafter WEBSTERS]. The VCLT was concluded on May 29, 1969 and
entered into force on January 20, 1980. A 1961 dictionary definition would thus provide an appropriate ordinary
meaning for words used in the treaty.
29
See definition of “humiliating” in WEBSTERS, supra note 28, at 1101.
30
See definition of “degrading” in WEBSTERS, supra note 28, at 594.
31
VCLT, supra note 23, art. 31 (2).
32
VCLT, supra note 23, art. 31 (3). The RESTATEMENT suggests that both “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent
practice in the application of the agreement” are to be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty provision.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 325 (2).
33
VCLT, supra note 23, art. 31 (4).
34
VCLT, supra note 23, art. 31; RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 325(2). Somewhat paradoxically, the Restatement
also notes that the President has broad authority to construe the words of treaties to be asserted by the United States
in its relations with other states (§ 326 (1)), but that authority is not unlimited. Glennon, supra note 12, at 134.
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In particular, the Convention Against Torture is relevant in determining whether the U.S. is
under a particular obligation to prevent outrages upon human dignity and, if so, in determining
the nature of that obligation.35
Furthermore, when Congress authorizes the President to unilaterally interpret treaty
provisions in the form of an executive order, this may constitute an explicit authorization to
violate customary international law related to norms of treaty interpretation.

Such an

authorization, considered alone, gives the President the necessary authority to violate the Third
Geneva Convention, Common Article 3, as well as other international laws protecting detainees
from outrages upon personal dignity based on the President’s assertion that a particular
interpretation is lawful. Crucially, however, Congress never authorized a violation of any treaty
obligations or other customary international law in the plain text of the MCA.
2. Congress Did Not Authorize a Violation of International Law in the MCA.
It is possible that Congress intended to write a law authorizing a violation of the Third
Geneva Convention, Common Article 3.36 The courts have upheld statutes that contravene

35

It is possible that the United States withdrew its consent to be bound by the specific wording of the Third Geneva
Convention, art. 3 (1)(c) with the ratification and statement to the Convention Against Torture, Cruel and Inhuman
Treatment. See note 120 infra. This possibility is explored and accepted in part in section 4 infra.
36
An argument could be made that the MCA section 3 (Chapter 47A, § 948b) provision that removes the Geneva
Conventions as a source of rights for “alien unlawful enemy combatants” is an explicit authorization to violate art. 5
of the Third Geneva Convention which affords the same protections for persons awaiting a determination of their
status as lawful combatants (Third Geneva Convention, art. 4) until the determination of an individual’s combatant
status has been made by a duly constituted military commission (assuming said military commission meets the art. 5
requirement as a “competent tribunal”). The Congressional record does not seem to support this intent even given
the MCA § 5(a): “No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or
other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the
Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or
its States or territories.” Furthermore, Art. 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
all persons deprived of their liberty treatment “with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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treaties, for example, when it is impossible to give effect to both.37 Congress could authorize
such a violation either explicitly38 or implicitly when it relates to a subject within its powers.39
However, Congress does not authorize the President to violate the Geneva Conventions or rules
of customary international law anywhere in the MCA. On the contrary, in response to the
Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,40 Congress took great pains to write the
MCA so that it would allow the U.S. to abide by its obligations under international law.41
During the debates in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on the Military
Commissions Act in September 2006,42 Congress repeatedly expressed its intention to be
specifically bound by the Third Geneva Convention.43 This intention supports over a century of
U.S. practice supporting the Geneva Conventions.44 Moreover, since the ratification of the treaty
by the U.S., Congress passed implementing legislation to see obligations fulfilled even though
none was required.45

37

Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, note 2 to preface,
§ 114 (construing a statute inconsistent with a treaty). Compare, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962); Nielsen
v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (construing a treaty in a manner inconsistent with statute).
38
Abram Chayes suggests that Congress “never explicitly authorizes the President to violate international law.”
Panel Discussion, The Authority of the United States Executive to Interpret, Articulate or Violate the Norms of
International Law, 80 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297-98 (1986) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
39
Taylor v. Morton, 23 F.Cas. 784, 786 (No. 13,799) (C.C.Mass. 1855), aff’d 67 U.S. 481 (1862); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (both noting that Congress’ power to
repeal a treaty is limited to those related to subjects within the powers of Congress).
40
548 U.S. 557, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
41
Justice Stevens in Hamdan found that the military commissions violated municipal law (U.S. Uniform Code of
Military Justice) and the Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
42
See, e.g,. 152 CONG. REC. H7522 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H7508 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006);
152 CONG. REC. S10354 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006 (part I)); and 152 CONG. REC. S10354 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006
(part II)).
43
See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7508, H7515 (statement of Rep. Pelosi); Id., H7516 (statement of Rep. Diaz-Balart);
152 CONG. REC. S10354 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006 (part II) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Id., S10408 (statement of Sen.
Biden).
44
Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to Counsel to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://www.lawofwar.org/Torture_Memos_analysis.htm (last visited April 22,
2007).
45
The issue arose as to whether the Third Geneva Convention was a self-executing treaty in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
Judge Robertson rejected the United States government’s argument that the Third Geneva Convention was non-selfexecuting treaty, finding that it was a self-executing treaty except in four respects, since the Executive did not
question the absence of implementing legislation. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (2004).
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Furthermore, Congress is explicit in the MCA itself that the U.S. shall satisfy its
obligations under Common Article 3.46 Although Congress also declares that “[n]o foreign or
international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the U.S. in
interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in subsection (d) of such section 2441” (emphasis
added),47 it is difficult to know what this means. It could mean that foreign law or the laws of
another nation state could not supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United
States.48 The second part is even more vague. In particular, it is unclear what an “international
source of law” might be, given that “international law is part of our law.”49 Specifically, the
record of the United States, including the passage of the MCA, shows an overwhelming
commitment to compliance with our obligations in the Geneva Conventions.
3. Limits on Presidential Authority to Interpret International Agreements
Since 2002, President George W. Bush has repeatedly declared that detainees in U.S.
custody should be treated “humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles” of the Geneva Conventions.50 The wording
“to the extent appropriate” has caused much controversy as to whether or not the President could
interpret the common understandings in the Third Geneva Convention inconsistently with what
has been U.S. practice not to torture or otherwise humiliate detainees in custody. Although he

46

At least they are explicit with respect to the MCA’s provision of an effective penal sanction. MCA, supra note 1,
§ 6 (2)).
47
MCA, supra note 1, § 2.
48
See 28 U.S.C. 1652 (rule of decision); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
49
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78. Professor Glennon
suggests this could be dictum since only the specific norm relied on could be part of United States law. Glennon,
supra note 12, at 265, citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (Clarendon Press
1979). Whether or not customary international law is properly thought of as federal common law has raised and
continues to raise considerable controversy among legal scholars. For arguments in favor, see Harold Hongju Koh,
Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). For arguments against, see Jack Goldsmith
and Curtis Bradley, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position 110
HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
50
E.g., Memorandum on the Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 2, 2002),
www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf;
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might like to think so, the President does not possess unlimited inherent powers to interpret the
language of treaties.51 Moreover, the President does not possess unlimited inherent powers to
interpret customary international law, a concurrent presidential power.52
Constitutional Text
The Constitution never makes reference to international law in the section delegating
power to the President. Yet, as treaties are a source of international law,53 the President has
some constitutional authority to interact with international law, a right found in Article II of the
Constitution.54 Notably, the President may make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate.55 Article II makes no reference to the interpretation of treaties, and yet the President has
some authority to determine the interpretation of an international agreement to be asserted by the
United States in its relations with other states pursuant to his foreign relations power in Sections
2-3.56

The President must interpret the nation’s international obligations pursuant to his

obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” which includes treaties57 and
(presumptively) customary international law.58
The President does not, however, have exclusive authority to interpret treaties. The
Senate, at times, may attach reservations, understandings, or declarations (RUDs) that give terms

51

Glennon, supra note 12, at 134. See also The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Interpretation Dispute, Committee on
International Arms Control and Security Affairs of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 43 RECORD
OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 300 (1988).
52
Glennon, supra note 12, at 275.
53
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 (1)(b), 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 993.
54
U.S. CONST., art. II.
55
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. At times, the Senate will “express a particular interpretation of the treaty as a condition
of its consent.” See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 181. The Senate may also clarify certain provisions, which can be
instructive for the President. Id. at 181, 449-50 n.25.
56
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 326 (1); HENKIN, supra note 16, at 249. The courts have given executive
interpretation of international agreements “weight” in Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933) (noting
Executive interpretation is inconclusive upon the courts), and “great weight” in Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,
194 (1961).
57
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3; U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2
58
Agora, May the President Violate Customary International Law? 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 917 (1986).
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of a treaty a specific meaning.59 In fact, the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the right to
“define and punish” offenses against the Law of Nations.60 The right to define and punish
offenses, however, assumes that the law has already been made, which would seem to remain in
the purview of the executive branch with the advice and consent of the Senate. Professor Koh
reads the offenses clause as a constitutional grant of authority to “construe the law of nations,”
which seems to expand what is provided in the plain text of the Constitution.61 Suffice it to say,
Congress, or perhaps only the Senate, has some authority to interpret international law, albeit
while it is still in the process of formation.62
The third branch of government, the federal judiciary, is granted some authority to
interpret international law.63 The judicial power extends inter alia to “the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority” and to controversies
with “foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”64 Moreover, the courts tend to apply international
law in five subject areas.65

Importantly, the punishment of war-related crimes, such as a

violation of the Third Geneva Convention, is one such area.66
The Constitutional text provides at least sufficient ambiguity to accord some powers to
each of the three branches with respect to an interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. The
President has some authority to interpret treaty provisions in making the treaty, in the conduct of

59

Henkin suggests that the Senate’s constitutional authority to attach RUDs has not been seriously questioned.
Henkin, supra note 16, at 181. The Supreme Court recognized the Senate’s power to condition consent to treaties in
Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869) (treaty modification or amendment). See also Fourteen Diamond Rings v.
United States, 183 U.S. 176, 182 (1901) (Brown, J., concurring) (pertains to treaty amending, qualifying or
modifying).
60
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (commonly referred to as the “offenses clause”).
61
Koh, supra note 49, at 1825.
62
Space does not permit a further elaboration on Congressional power with respect to the formation of international
law.
63
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
64
Id.
65
THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 111 (West Publishing Group 2d. Ed. 1993) (1987).
66
Id.
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his foreign relations, and in faithfully executing the laws of the land. Congress, or more
specifically, the Senate, has the authority to attach RUDs to a treaty to alter the content of an
international understanding. The judiciary may review controversies related to international law.
This is quite properly the case, since three branches make up this national government, which is
accorded specific rights and duties in international relations.
Cases and Practice
The plain text constitutional grant of authority to interpret international law may only be
clear as far as its delegation to each of the three branches. What is very unclear—and it has been
the source of endless debate—are the boundaries of authority granted by the Constitution. In the
realm of interpretation of treaties and customary law, controversies have arisen as to whether the
President may interpret the meaning of a treaty provision with a meaning different than the one
the Senate consented to in the ratification process67 and whether the courts must defer to the
executive’s interpretation of a treaty.68 The President is sometimes (wrongly) considered the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations,69 which some courts and observers have concluded
gives the President power to take measures that may constitute violations of international law by
the United States.70

67

Glennon, supra note 12, at 134-145 (discussing the controversies that arose regarding the ABM Treaty (Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435) and the INF Treaty (Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter
Range Missiles, Treaty Doc. No. 100-11 (1988)).
68
See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913)
(both noting “weight”). Compare Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929). Contra, Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
187, 194 (1961) (“great weight”).
69
For example Philip Trimble argues that the President’s powers as “sole organ” derive from the “vestings clause.”
PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 47-78 (New York, NY:
Foundation Press 2002). John Marshall actually coined the phrase on the floor of the House of Representatives. 6
Annals of Cong. 613 (1800), cited in Glennon, supra note 12, at 8 n. 34. Justice Sutherland quoted Marshall in
United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
70
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 115, reporter’s note 3.

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 76

The cases and practice related to the President’s ability to violate international law are
instructive to the discussion of whether or not the President may interpret international law, since
his ability to interpret would only be permissible so long as it did not constitute a violation of the
law. Where the President would be precluded from committing a violation, there too would his
interpretive authority end. In The Paquete Habana, the majority opinion stopped short of
answering the question whether the President could violate international law.71 Writing the
dissenting opinion, Judge Fuller left no question on the matter, “[i]n my judgment, the rule is that
exemption from the rigors of war is in the control of the Executive. He is bound by no
immutable rule on the subject. It is for him to apply, or to modify, or to deny altogether . . . .”72
Given the plain text meaning of the Constitution implying shared power to interpret
American obligations under international law, Judge Fuller’s approach is not reasonable. Case
law and practice have, over time, arrived at a reasoned approach to the President’s authority to
violate international law. Presidential authority would depend on three factors: (1) whether the
law was law for the United States in the form of a treaty or federal common law in the form of
customary international law;73 (2) absent a treaty, whether there was a controlling legislative,
executive74 or judicial act that would trump existing federal common law;75 (3) if no controlling
constitutional act, whether there was a clearly defined, widely accepted norm76 applicable. In the
matter of treaties, as in federal common law applications of customary international law, the case
law suggests that the President may violate international law only when acting with Congress.77
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Id. at 721 (Fuller, M., dissenting).
73
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (Oxford University Press 4th Ed. 1990)
(1966).
74
A “controlling executive act” may not be one made by the President himself. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d
1446, 1454 (1986).
75
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
76
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). Compare, Swift v. Tyson 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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Acting without Congressional concurrence, the President’s authority is limited by federal
common law.78 “In the absence of statutory authorization . . . the President is bound by . . . rules
of customary international law [that are] clearly defined and widely accepted.”79
Agreement on a re-interpretation of the meaning of a treaty would seem to be allowed,
provided that the meaning was consistent with the object and purpose of a treaty.

An

interpretation of any international law would, by analogy, seem to be within the realm of the
faithful execution clause unless and until the President’s interpretation amounted to an
abrogation of the treaty.80
Framers’ Intent
The Framers were interested in limiting executive power in the realm of its ability to act
unilaterally in making international agreements to be sure.81 The Framers intended for the
federal courts to apply customary international law consistent with the requirements necessary
for the maintenance of international harmony,82 presumably so that the United States could be
viewed as law-abiding.83 In 1789, the Continental Congress expressly resolved that the United
States would cause the “law of nations to be strictly observed.”84 The Framers were seemingly
less particular about the ways in which international law became law of the land than upholding
such obligations, once they did.
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Functional Considerations
While it may be sensible to think that the President has sole power to enter into
international agreements to carry out his powers granted by the Constitution,85 it is equally
sensible to think that where the Constitution has accorded a role to each of the three branches of
government, each branch should exercise those powers at the right time. That the President has
voiced his opinion about the meaning of treaties, that the Senate has provided RUDs to clarify
the meaning of treaty provisions, and that the courts have relied on some norms of customary
international law all support the principle of having each branch serve its respective function in
the area of treaty interpretation.
Note on the President, Congress, and the Courts
Since the MCA directs the federal courts not to apply customary international law as an
interpretive tool in the United States,86 it is useful to consider (albeit briefly) the courts’ ability to
check the President’s interpretive authority after the passage of the MCA in 2006.
Restricting the ability of the courts to rely on customary international law flies in the face
of long-standing practice,87 but could, in theory, be done88 unless such a restriction is prohibited
by the Constitution. In The Nereide, Justice Marshall wrote that the “Court is bound by the law
of nations, which is part of the law of the land,” until Congress passes an act that violates
international law.89

Congress would be barred from legislating a prohibition that the
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87
“The courts have always considered the law of nations to be part of the law of the United States.” Glennon, supra
note 12, at 254.
88
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 128-129 (1814); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815). See also Diggs v.
Schultz, 470 F.2d. 461, 466-67 (1972) (“Under our constitutional scheme Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit
to do so, and there is nothing the other branches of government can do about it.”). “Denouncing” cannot amount to
a legislated restriction on a constitutional power of the judiciary to apply customary international law.
89
13 U.S. at 423.
86

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 79

Constitution requires.90 The applicable provision of the Constitution is Article III, § 2, which
extends the juridical power of the United States to all cases “arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”91
Congress could not write legislation constraining the ability of the courts to apply the laws of the
United States. This appears to be consistent with the intent of some Senators in writing the
MCA.92
In a joint statement, Senators McCain, Warner, and Graham suggest that if treaties are to
be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of
federal law is the province and duty of the judiciary headed by the Supreme Court. They
conclude that while “the President certainly has the constitutional authority to interpret our
Nation's treaty obligations, such interpretations are subject to judicial review.”93 Whether this
statement is absolutely correct is another matter. A plausible case could be made that judicial
review of Presidential authority to interpret our nation’s international obligations could be
removed where no clearly defined rule of customary international law exists.
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The Supreme Court held in Clearfield Trust v. United States that federal common law
controlled the “duties of the United States.”94 The federal courts have also applied federal
common law to executive officials in cases involving grants of immunity95 and with respect to
executive activities in the realm of foreign relations.96

Courts may consider questions of

international law and decide them against executive policy.97 Federal courts apply their own
rules to acts of the Executive, not statutes.98 Federal courts may make laws of the United States,
which have as much legal validity and obligation as if they had been made by the Legislature.99
Since no ruling has presented a rationale for the federal courts’ creation of substantive
rules of decision based on foreign law or otherwise, Professor Glennon suggests two possible
jurisdictions for the common-law power of the federal judiciary: jurisdictional grants and
Congressional acquiescence.100 A jurisdictional grant would assume that the “laws of the United
States” provision of the Constitution101 includes federal statutes and federal common law. The
second jurisdiction is based on the consistent support of Congress for the federal courts to
participate in lawmaking when they apply federal common law. Professor Glennon suggests that
“[w]hen Congress chooses not to legislate and the federal interest is sufficiently strong with
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respect to a particular controversy, a judge-made rule is not only permissible but vital to the
smooth functioning of a modern federal government.”102
By this rationale, Congress could limit the Court’s ability to check the President by
withdrawing a jurisdictional grant or usurping an area where acquiescence was controlling by
speaking through legislation. That may yet be the effect of the MCA. Perhaps even more
worrisome than the Court’s inability to check the President’s power by applying federal common
law is the possibility that the Court would not be able to find its own meaning of “outrages upon
personal dignity” in customary practice of states to support an individual’s claim against the U.S.
government for treatment similar to that received by detainees at Abu Ghraib.103
4. Revisiting the President’s Authority – Congressional Delegation in the MCA and the
Zone of Twilight
The President’s authority to interpret the Third Geneva Convention presumes that the
United States has obligations to uphold Common Article 3, in particular.104 In determining that
the United States has an obligation to protect detainees from outrages upon personal dignity, one
could look to the substance of the treaty text as supreme law of the land105 or to customary
international law, which is like federal common law applicable in the United States.106 The
United States has ratified the Third Geneva Convention without reservation. That ratification
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does not preclude the United States from altering the content of its obligation by subsequent
agreement.107 In its reservation to the Convention Against Torture,108 the United States, acting
through the Senate, applied a special meaning to the phrase “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”109 It is of course possible that the United States intended to consent
only to this portion of the Third Geneva Convention as well.
There is some support for the idea that the content of U.S. obligations in the Third
Geneva Convention Common Article 3(1)(c) has changed as the U.S. understanding of the terms
used therein has been articulated. As mentioned, Congress has given the President authority as
provided by the Constitution and MCA, § 6110 to interpret the meaning and application of the
Geneva Conventions111 and “to promulgate higher standards” and “administrative regulations”
for violations of treaty regulations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.112
According to a Joint Statement submitted to the Congressional Record during the debate of the
MCA by Senators Warner, McCain, and Graham, “when Congress says that the President can
interpret the meaning of Geneva, it is merely reasserting a longstanding constitutional
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principle.”113 If that is really what the President is doing, then he is free to interpret only insofar
as those constitutional principles have been established in U.S. law.
If the United States had not altered the content of its obligations in the Third Geneva
Convention before the MCA, the situation presented in the MCA suggests that it has redefined
some of its obligations.114 Further, these obligations appear to be stronger commitments than
those presented in the Third Geneva Convention—particularly if the phrase “outrages upon
personal dignity” has no meaning in U.S. law.115 For Congress has given the President authority
to issue an executive order that would act as an authoritative interpretation116 of Common Article
3 but carves out an exception for what would be a grave breach of Common Article 3.117 The
grave breaches defined by Congress include definitions for “torture,” “cruel and inhumane
treatment,” “performing biological experiments,” “murder,” “mutilation or maiming,”
“intentionally causing serious bodily injury,” “rape,” “sexual assault or abuse,” and “taking
hostages.” Congress established violations (grave breaches) of Common Article 3,118 which are
prohibited by U.S. law.
By establishing a separate category for grave breaches for cruel, degrading and inhuman
treatment, Congress sought to limit the obligations of the United States to articulated war crimes.
“Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’’ thus took on a meaning of cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
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Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States
Reservations, Declarations and the MCA119 and the Understandings to the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.120
Since Congress has chosen to remain silent on the question of what “outrages upon
personal dignity” means in the MCA, but nonetheless granted the President interpretive authority
to give that phrase meaning with an executive order, it would seem that in issuing such an order
the President would be acting at his highest ebb of power.121 Even at the highest ebb, the
President would be subject to any constraints placed on a definition for “outrages upon personal
dignity” in customary international law. Customary international law exists in federal common
law in the zone of twilight where there are no Congressional acts,122 and the Supreme Court has
said that federal common law exists where there is no controlling executive act, legislative act, or
judicial act.123 Since Congress has only spoken with respect to the delegation of interpretive
authority and not on a permissible violation of customary international law, the President is still
bound by customary international law norms in the Third Geneva Convention as it applies to
detainees.
Conclusion
If the United States must violate international law to deal with the terrorist threat the
MCA is designed to combat, then the President should have had no trouble persuading Congress
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to authorize that violation.124 That was not the case. In Congressional debates, members
reiterated the importance of honoring our international commitments agreed to in the Geneva
Conventions for legal and practical reasons.125 Congress failed to enact a sufficient definition for
“outrages upon personal dignity,” and as such, this concept is in a kind of “zone of twilight”126
where customary international law is relevant.127
The question I leave for others is whether there is a degree of consensus128 in customary
international law norms regulating “outrages upon personal dignity.”129 If there is protection
afforded by this reasonably settled international norm, Americans may yet have hope that the
Supreme Court will decide to apply these norms to unreasonable interpretations by the Executive
that permit too much by our moral standards, but may be permissible according to the strict
definitions given by Congress in the MCA.130 Since Congress did not define an outrage upon
personal dignity, the President and the federal courts still may interpret this phrase. Given that
federal courts have applied customary international law in the past as part of U.S. law, they may
do so again even in the face of the MCA’s purported limitations to judicial interpretive authority.
Professor Henkin observed that customary international law, and even the interpretations
of a treaty, may change in response to new needs or new insights.131 He continued,
A state might knowingly deviate from what had been established law (or
established interpretation of a treaty) in the hope of changing the law. But that
state does so at its own peril. It does so at the peril that it will not succeed in
changing the law and will be adjudged to have violated the law.132
124

Glennon, supra note 12, at 271.
152 CONG. REC. S10354, S10399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006).
126
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
127
Glennon, supra note 12, at 281.
128
The Paquete Habana implied that an international norm be “a settled rule of international law.” 175 U.S. 677,
694 (1900).
129
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, Common Article III (1)(c).
130
MCA, supra note 1, § 6 (c)(2).
131
Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 293, 311 (1991).
132
Id.
125

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 86

The municipal law of the United States is not wholly dissimilar when interpretations of
customary international law and treaties are concerned. The President might knowingly deviate
from an established interpretation or agreed upon term in the hope of changing the law, but if he
exceeds the bounds of his authority, Congress or the Judiciary will hold him to account. In the
matter of the Military Commissions Act and the Geneva Conventions, Congress has taken a clear
stance to constrain the President’s ability to interpret the ambiguous meaning of some
protections afforded by Common Article 3, albeit while authorizing a violation of the laws of
treaty interpretation. Hopefully the President will not take advantage of the opportunity to
render the idea of outrages upon personal dignity meaningless, but only time will tell.
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